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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a privilege to contribute to the Pepperdine Law Review's
symposium honoring Justice Allen M. Linden. As others have noted, Justice
Linden is a leading figure in the field of tort law, not only in his home
country of Canada, but also in the United States and throughout the world.
It is fitting, therefore, for a diverse group of tort scholars to recognize his
accomplishments by addressing the fascinating question of whether the
world still needs U.S. tort law.
During the past generation, many have looked to U.S. tort law as a
beacon. Indeed, U.S. courts frequently grapple with the extent to which
foreign litigants can use the American system, which is generally viewed as
welcoming to those harmed by tortious conduct.' This paper, however,
considers situations where the dynamic is nearly the opposite-cases where
plaintiffs file lawsuits abroad, and then return to the United States to enforce
judgments based on more plaintiff-friendly foreign law. The particular topic
* Paul E. Beam Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. The author
thanks Andrew Lehmann for his excellent research assistance in preparing this paper. Thanks also to
George Wright for his helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and Global Economic Welfare:
Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L. REv. 1137, 1137 (2007) ("The substantive tort law
and related procedural mechanisms available in U.S. courts are generally much more favorable to
plaintiffs, and produce much larger recoveries, than the law and procedures available in foreign
courts."); Lory Barsdate Easton, Getting Out of Dodge: Defense Pointers on Jurisdictional Issues in
Aviation Torts Litigation, 20 AIR & SPACE LAW. 9, 9 (2006) ("One very clear trend in U.S. products
liability litigation over the past several years has been an increase in litigation brought by overseas
plaintiffs arising from overseas incidents and injuries.").
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addressed in this paper is "libel tourism," a phrase used to describe cases
where plaintiffs sue for defamation in a foreign jurisdiction and then seek to
enforce judgments in the United States, where the outcome might have been
different because of protections for speech embodied in the United States
Constitution.2
A number of commentators have discussed libel tourism at length, and
this paper will not provide a treatise on the topic. Rather, the paper will
review recent reactions from legislators, courts, and commentators, and then
offer some thoughts about whether these reactions appropriately balance
concerns of comity and free speech. Ultimately, the paper concludes that
U.S. attempts to address the issue of libel tourism have been quite broad and
suggests a more cautious approach that would better contribute to
maintaining America's role as a leader in the evolving world of tort law.
II. LIBEL TOURISM BACKGROUND
Courts and commentators have expressed concern about libel tourism
for years, but a recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals thrust the
issue into the spotlight.4 In Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, Rachel Ehrenfeld
wrote a book entitled, Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed-and How
to Stop It, which was published by a Chicago-based publisher.' The book
asserted that Khalid Salim Bin Mahfouz, a Saudi Arabian financier,
provided support for al Qaeda and "other 'Islamist terror groups."' 6
Although published in the United States, twenty-three copies were sold in
the United Kingdom via internet purchase, and a chapter of the book was
2. See Tara Sturtevant, Can the United States Talk the Talk & Walk the Walk When it Comes to
Libel Tourism: How the Freedom to Sue Abroad Can Kill the Freedom of Speech at Home, 22 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 269, 269 (2010); Doug Rendleman, Collecting a Libel Tourist's Defamation
Judgment?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467,468 (2010) ("A libel tourist is a forum shopper with two
scarce attributes. First, a forum-shopping plaintiff usually prefers to sue his defendant in the United
States because of its courts' discovery, jury trials, and generous damages. But a libel tourist is a
forum shopper who shuns the United States."). England is the primary venue for libel tourists.
However, nations such as Singapore, New Zealand, Kyrgyzstan, and Australia are also popular libel
tourism destinations. See Sturtevant, supra, at 280; Sarah Staveley-O'Carroll, Libel Tourism Laws:
Spoiling the Holiday and Saving the First Amendment?, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 252, 263 (2009).
3. See, e.g., Sturtevant, supra note 2, at 269; Rendleman, supra note 2, at 467; Staveley-
O'Carroll, supra note 2, at 252; Todd W. Moore, Untying Our Hands: The Case for Uniform
Personal Jurisdiction Over "Libel Tourists", 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 3207 (2009); Richard Garnett &
Megan Richardson, Libel Tourism or Just Redress? Reconciling the (English) Right to Reputation
with the (American) Right to Free Speech in Cross-Border Libel Cases, 5 J PRIVATE INT'L L. 471
(2009); Raymond W. Beauchamp, England's Chilling Forecast: The Case for Granting Declaratory
Relief to Prevent English Defamation Actions from Chilling American Speech, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
3073 (2006).
4. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830 (N.Y. 2007).
5. Id. at 831-32.
6. Id. at 832.
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available on ABC News's website in the United Kingdom.7 Bin Mahfouz
subsequently sued Ehrenfeld for defamation in England.8 Ehrenfeld refused
to appear in that action "because of the cost of litigating in England, the
procedural barriers facing a libel defendant under English law and
[Ehrenfeld's] disagreement in principle with defendant's alleged attempt to
chill her speech in New York by suing in a claimant-friendly libel
jurisdiction to which she lacked any tangible connection." 9
An English court entered a default judgment against Ehrenfeld and her
publisher, awarding damages and prohibiting additional publications of
defamatory statements about Bin Mahfouz in England and Wales.'o
Although Bin Mahfouz did not attempt to enforce the judgment in the
United States, Ehrenfeld filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court
in New York, seeking an order that the English default judgment was
unenforceable in the United States." The district court dismissed the action,
finding that it did not have personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1) of
the New York Civil Practice Law And Rules (CPLR).12
Ehrenfeld appealed to the Second Circuit, which certified the
jurisdictional question to the New York Court of Appeals.13 Responding to
the certified question, the New York court affirmed the federal district
court's decision:
Confronted, as we are, with a demand letter sent by English solicitors
requesting-among other things-"[a]n undertaking to the High Court
in England" not to repeat [Ehrenfeld's] alleged defamatory statements
as well as [Bin Mahfouz's] service of documents and other mailings
related to the English action, we, too, conclude that [Bin Mahfouz] has
not purposely availed himself of the laws of New York.14
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id at 832-33.
10. Id. at 833.
11. Id.
12. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (McKinney 2008) ("(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction.
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or
through an agent: 1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or
services in the state . . . .").
13. Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 831 ("(W]hether CPLR 302(a)(1) confers personal jurisdiction over
a person '(1) who sued a New York resident in a non-U.S. jurisdiction; and (2) whose contacts with
New York stemmed from the foreign lawsuit and whose success in the foreign suit resulted in acts
that must be performed by the subject of the suit in New York."' (citation omitted)).
14. Id. at 836.
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The Ehrenfeld case crystallized several issues that have become targets
for critics of libel tourism. First, it appears that the English judgment was
inconsistent with U.S. law-or at least that Bin Mahfouz would have had a
more difficult time succeeding in a defamation action against Ehrenfeld had
he filed suit in the United States. Ever since the landmark case of New York
Times v. Sullivan, " the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment
as requiring plaintiffs to clear hurdles that were not part of a common law
defamation action in an effort to balance the Constitution's protection of
speech with each state's authority to protect its citizens' reputations through
tort law. 16 Generalizing a bit, at least in cases that touch on matters of
public concern, a plaintiff must prove some level of fault regarding the
defendant's knowledge of the truth or falsity of an alleged defamatory
statement."7 In addition, the Supreme Court has held that, under the First
Amendment, plaintiffs must prove a statement's falsity, rather than requiring
defendants to prove a statement's truth.18
These First Amendment protections have no direct analogue in England.
There, defamation law presumes the falsity of a statement, and a defendant
must prove truth as a defense.' 9 In addition, with only a few exceptions,
defamation in England is a strict liability tort-that is, plaintiffs do not
normally need to prove fault regarding a defendant's knowledge of falsity.
One exception involves "fair comment" for "responsible journalism" based
on disclosed and accurate facts. 20 Perhaps Ehrenfeld could have raised this
15. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16. Id at 279-80 ("The constitutional guarantees [of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press] require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not."); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974) ("[W]e
conclude that the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for
defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual.").
17. See N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 ("We hold that, so long
as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual."); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985)
("[P]ermitting recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases absent a showing of
'actual malice' does not violate the First Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve
matters of public concern.").
18. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) ("We believe that the
common law's rule on falsity-that the defendant must bear the burden of proving truth-must
similarly fall here to a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity,
as well as fault, before recovering damages.").
19. See Sturtevant, supra note 2, at 275 ("In England, defamatory statements by their nature are
presumed false. A defendant may, as a defense, plead that his statements were true and thus
justified. However, to mount this defense, the defendant must prove the substantial truth of every
material fact. A material fact is defined as anything that 'adds weight to the imputation.' Proving
truth is no simple task." (quoting Beauchamp, supra note 3, at 3078)); see also Moore, supra note 3,
at 3212; Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 2, at 257.
20. See Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 2, at 257 ("British courts have carved out limited
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argument had she defended her action in England. But, even if she had, Bin
Mahfouz's path to success in his defamation action undoubtedly was easier
in England than in the United States.21
A second important issue highlighted by Ehrenfeld is the fact that the
English court issued a judgment against Ehrenfeld despite her very limited
contact with England. This is consistent with English defamation law's
focus on the right to reputation, with little regard to where the defendant
lives. 22 American critics of libel tourism argue that judgments in England
(or elsewhere) can have a chilling effect on speech in the United States, even
when authors and others engaging in speech make efforts to avoid contact
with foreign jurisdictions.23 This is understandable in an era where
technology permits words to spread throughout the world, whether or not a
speaker instigates distribution. The problem is exacerbated by England's
use of the "multiple publication" rule, which "holds that every publication of
the disputed work, in any forum throughout the world, gives rise to a
separate tort" and, potentially, a new cause of action.24 This means that a
exceptions to the strict liability regime for 'fair comment,' which protects reasonable opinions based
on disclosed, accurate facts, and for 'responsible journalism,' which protects factually inaccurate
statements on matters of public interest."); Kyu Ho Youm, Liberalizing British Defamation Law: A
Case of Importing the First Amendment?, 13 COMM. L. & POL'Y 415 (2008) (discussing Jameel v.
Wall St. Journal Eur. Sprl, [2006] UKH-L 44 (appeal taken from Eng.), which held that responsible
reporting on a matter of public interest is protected from defamation claims, as well as Reynolds v.
Times Newspapers Ltd., [1999] 4 All E.R. 609 (H.L.) 625 (appeal taken from Eng.), which set forth
a ten-factor test to determine "responsible journalism"); see also infra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
21. Indeed, precedent does exist where U.S. courts have refused to enforce defamation
judgments in England because they are not consistent with U.S. constitutional law. See Bachchan v.
India Abroad Publ'ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992); see also Moore, supra note 3, at
3213-14.
22. See Garnett & Richardson, supra note 3, at 473-74 ("[F]rom the English (and
Commonwealth) perspective, vindicating a claimant's right to reputation is the core of a libel action
and such a policy should not depend upon whether the defendant is local or foreign. Indeed, the
right to reputation is enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
which has been implemented by the UK in the Human Rights Act of 1998." (citing European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8,
213 U.N.T.S. 221)).
23. See Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 2, at 268-69 (stating that some authors and publishers try
to minimize risk by not publishing work in the United Kingdom, but even then "avoiding physical
publication in the United Kingdom does not necessarily save American publishers from liability
there"); Moore, supra note 3, at 3214-15. With regard to Ehrenfeld, one commentator stated:
"Although Ehrenfeld faced little risk of having to pay Bin Mahfouz damages in New York, she
could not remove the 'sword of Damocles' hanging over her head. It undermined her reputation as a
counter-terrorism expert and threatened her credit history." Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 2, at
275. But see Garnett & Richardson, supra note 3, at 478 (noting that "Ehrenfeld's book still remains
in print in the US and there has been no effort by Mahfouz to enforce the order .... All in all, there
is little evidence that authorities such as Ehrenfeld have directly 'chilled' free speech in the US.").
24. See Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 2, at 260-61; Garnett & Richardson, supra note 3, at 471;
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limitations period might not expire until a publication is unavailable in any
format-including online.25
Finally, Ehrenfeld shows that even if a U.S. court ultimately wants to do
something about a foreign defamation judgment, it might have trouble
obtaining jurisdiction. Unlike English and other Commonwealth courts,
which take jurisdiction almost on the basis of publication alone,2 6 U.S.
courts interpret due process as requiring a defendant to have minimum
contacts with a state before personal jurisdiction can attach.27 This can lead
to anomalous situations where one U.S. citizen sues another U.S. citizen for
defamation in England,28 with the defendant later having trouble seeking
relief (for example, filing a declaratory judgment action to prevent
enforcement of a judgment) in her home state because the original plaintiff
did not have sufficient contacts in that jurisdiction.
see also infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text (discussing proposed changes to English libel
laws).
25. See Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 2, at 260-69. In the United States, by contrast, a "single
publication" rule applies, meaning that a limitations period runs from the date of the first
publication. See Ogden v. As§'n of U.S. Army, 177 F. Supp. 498, 502 (D.D.C. 1959) ("[I]t is the
prevailing American doctrine that the publication of a book, periodical, or newspaper containing
defamatory matter gives rise to but one cause of action for libel, which accrues at the time of the
original publication, and that the statute of limitations runs from that date.").
26. See Garnett & Richardson, supra note 3, at 471-72.
27. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("[D]ue process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'); see also Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("[Ilit is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State
..... ); Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 834-35 (N.Y. 2007); Garnett & Richardson,
supra note 3, at 472 (in the defamation context, "[m]inimum contacts may be established by a
substantial circulation of publications in the forum state or where the publication in the forum was
accompanied by other significant contacts such as soliciting subscriptions and responses from forum
residents." (citations omitted)). U.S. courts also apply an "effects test" when determining personal
jurisdiction, looking to whether the "forum was targeted by the defendant's publications." Id. (citing
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984); Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media Inc., 415 F.3d 419
(5th Cir. 2005); Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002); Remick v. Manfredy,
238 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2001)).
28. See Garnett & Richardson, supra note 3, at 476-77 ("[S]uch actions likely ... appear as a
cynical attempt by US residents to forum shop internationally to evade their own freedom of
expression laws .... [R]ecently, it has been suggested that . . . U[.]S[.] celebrities (mainly
Hollywood actors) have filed libel suits in England against US publishers, with numbers expected to
rise in the future. English courts clearly have become a magnet for celebrity litigation." (citation
omitted)).
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III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
A. United States
In light of the issues noted above, the response to Ehrenfeld was swift
and largely negative. This section of the paper describes the major events.
First, the section discusses the New York legislature's response to the
decision-the Libel Terrorism Protection Act.29 Next, the section describes
proposed federal legislation aimed at deterring libel tourism.30 The section
then reviews some proposals for change to defamation law being considered
in England itself.3 ' Before heading into this discussion, it is important to
note that principles of comity normally lead U.S. courts to honor valid
judgments from a foreign court.32 As one will see, however, this was not the
intent of American legislative responses to cases like Ehrenfeld.
In 2008, the New York legislature passed the Libel Terrorism Protection
Act.33  The act was designed to address the issue of obtaining personal
jurisdiction over a plaintiff in a foreign defamation action, as well as the
substantive issue of whether a New York court would enforce a foreign
judgment. 3 On the procedural issue, the legislature essentially amended its
long-arm statute to permit its courts to take jurisdiction in cases like
Ehrenfeld:
The courts of this state shall have personal jurisdiction over any
person who obtains a judgment in a defamation proceeding outside
the United States against any person who is a resident of New York
or is a person or entity amenable to jurisdiction in New York who
29. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 66, § 3 (codified at N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302, 5304 (McKinney 2008)); see
infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing exception to this general rule when
enforcement of the foreign judgment would be "repugnant" to U.S. public policy); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 481-82 (1987);
Yaad Rotem, The Problem of Selective or Sporadic Recognition: A New Economic Rationale for the
Law ofForeign Country Judgments, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 505, 510-11 (2010) ("[T]o. .. ensure that its
own judgments are recognized abroad, some form of cooperation of the forum with the foreign
country is therefore inevitable."). By way of analogy, a similar exception to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution operates between states. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-
22 (1979) ("A judgment entered in one State must be respected in another provided that the first
State had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. . . . But this [Court's precedents] ...
clearly establish[] that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State to apply another
State's law in violation of its own legitimate public policy." (citation omitted)).
33. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302, 5304.
34. Id
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has assets in New York or may have to take actions in New York to
comply with the judgment, for the purposes of rendering declaratory
relief with respect to that person's liability for the judgment, and/or
for the purpose of determining whether said judgment should be
deemed non-recognizable pursuant to [N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304], to the
fullest extent permitted by the United States constitution, provided:
1. the publication at issue was published in New York, and
2. that resident or person amenable to jurisdiction in New York (i)
has assets in New York which might be used to satisfy the foreign
defamation judgment, or (ii) may have to take actions in New York
to comply with the foreign defamation judgment. The provisions of
this subdivision shall apply to persons who obtained judgments in
defamation proceedings outside the United States prior to and/or
after the effective date of this subdivision.3 s
Next, regarding the substantive issue, the New York legislature decided
that a New York court need not recognize a foreign defamation judgment if
the judgment was inconsistent with constitutional principles regarding free
speech and freedom of the press:
A foreign country judgment need not be recognized if:
... the cause of action resulted in a defamation judgment obtained
in a jurisdiction outside the United States, unless the court before
which the matter is brought sitting in this state first determines that
the defamation law applied in the foreign court's adjudication
provided at least as much protection for freedom of speech and
press in that case as would be provided by both the United States
and New York constitutions. 36
Shortly after enactment of the New York law, at least three other states
followed suit, passing statutes designed to deter libel tourists. 37
The states' responses raise a number of concerns. First, non-recognition
provisions raise comity issues, assuming one begins from the perspective
that U.S. courts should honor fairly-rendered judgments issued elsewhere
unless the foreign decision is "repugnant" to United States public policy.3 8
35. Id § 302(d) (alteration in original).
36. Id § 5304(b)(8).
37. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1716-1717 (West Supp. 2009); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209 (b-
5), 5/12-621 (b)(7) (2009); FLA. STAT. § 55.605 (2)(h) (2009).
38. See Moore, supra note 3, at 3218 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482(2)(d) (1987)); Charles W. Mondora, The Public Policy
Exception, "The Freedom of Speech, or of the Press," and the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2008) (quoting the public policy
exemption of the Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act).
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Whether non-adherence to First Amendment doctrine rises to this level is an
issue addressed in more detail below.39  Second, having individual states
enact their own laws raises serious concerns about consistency, particularly
in an area where the sensitivities of foreign nations are at stake and where
principles of federal constitutional law are driving the laws' enactments.
On the latter point, federal legislators quickly stepped into the breach
and proposed national legislation aimed at libel tourism. The first was a
House of Representatives bill proposed by Darrell Issa of California and
Steve Cohen of Tennessee. 40 The bill, which the House passed unanimously
in 2008,41 recognized that U.S. courts normally enforce foreign judgments as
a matter of comity but declared that this should not include foreign
judgments inconsistent with U.S. constitutional rights of free speech.4 2 With
that set out, the bill concluded:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, a
domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for
defamation that is based upon a publication concerning a public
figure or a matter of public concern unless the domestic court
determines that the foreign judgment is consistent with the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.43
As it goes, the Cohen-Issa Libel Tourism Bill simply would have
codified on a federal level the notion that foreign defamation judgments
inconsistent with First Amendment principles are "repugnant" to U.S.
policy-a view that does have some backing in legal precedent."
In 2009, however, members of the House and Senate proposed a law
that would have gone substantially further. The proposed legislation, called
the Free Speech Protection Act (FSPA), specifically provided overseas
defendants an opportunity to seek a declaratory judgment in a U.S. court
precluding the collection of a foreign defamation judgment.45 In addition,
the FSPA would have provided the foreign defamation defendant the ability
39. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
40. H.R. 6146, 110th Cong. (as passed by House, Sept. 27, 2008).
41. See Sturtevant, supra note 2, at 288.
42. H.R. 6146, 110th Cong. § 1(a)(5)-(6) (as passed by House, Sept. 27, 2008).
43. Id § 2(a).
44. See RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED
FEDERAL STATUTE § 5 cmt. at 80 (2006) (citing Telnikoff v. Matusevich, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997);
Louis Feraud Int'l S.A.R.L. v. Viewfinder Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Bachan v.
India Abroad Publ'ns., Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992); Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd.,
237 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y 2002), aj'd, 346 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003)).
45. H.R. 1304, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 449, 111th Cong. (2009).
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to counter-sue in the United States for damages based on the amount of the
foreign judgment, reasonable legal fees, and any harm suffered by the
foreign defendant due to diminished opportunities to publish, research or
obtain funding. 6 The FSPA would have tripled damages upon a finding that
the foreign plaintiff "intentionally engaged in a scheme to suppress First
Amendment rights." 47
The 110th Congressional session ended without further action on the
competing bills. In 2010, however, members of the 11Ith Congress
reconciled their differences, and passed new legislation with language
similar to what was originally in the Cohen-Issa bill. 48 The new legislation,
however, dropped the FSPA's damages section, save for reasonable
attorney's fees where a foreign defendant succeeds in a declaratory action
based on the provisions of the statute.49 President Obama signed the
legislation into law on August 10, 2010.50 As discussed below, the new
legislation represents a move in the right direction toward finding a solution
to the libel tourism problem that appropriately balances the right to free
speech with concerns about comity and the ability of other nations to enforce
their own values with regard to the protection of reputation.
46. See Free Speech Protection Act of 2009, S. 449, 11Ith Cong. § 3(c) (2009).
47. H.R. 1304 § 3(d); see also S. 449 § 3(d).
48. See Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage
(SPEECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 4101-05).
The exact language reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, a domestic court shall not
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation unless the domestic court
determines that-
(A) the defamation law applied in the foreign court's adjudication provided at least as
much protection for freedom of speech and press in that case as would be provided by the
first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by the constitution and law
of the State in which the domestic court is located; or
(B) even if the defamation law applied in the foreign court's adjudication did not
provide as much protection for freedom of speech and press as the first amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and the constitution and law of the State, the party
opposing recognition or enforcement of that foreign judgment would have been found
liable for defamation by a domestic court applying the first amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and the constitution and law of the State in which the
domestic court is located.
Id § 3, 124 Stat. at 2381 (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)).
49. See id. § 3, 124 Stat. at 2383-84 (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 4105). The new law also
provides a broad removal provision that would allow a foreign defendant to remove a case to federal
court if the foreign plaintiff seeks enforcement of a judgment in state court. See id § 3, 124 Stat. at
2383 (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 4103). Removal would be proper without regard to complete
diversity of the parties and regardless of the amount in controversy. See id. (to be codified as 28
U.S.C. § 4103(3)).
50. See Editorial, No More 'Libel Tourists': Congress Steps in to Protect Writers; Now Britain
Must Do its Part, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 16160988 (Aug. 13, 2010).
51. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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B. England
Action, however, has not been limited to the U.S. side of the Atlantic.
At the same time that U.S. legislators have been debating legislation directed
at libel tourism, policy makers in England have been debating changes to
their own defamation laws. During the recent parliamentary campaign in
England, for example, Nick Clegg, leader of the Liberal-Democrat Party
(now a member of the governing coalition) made statements that could well
have come from an American frustrated by libel tourists:
Our libel law and practice have turned a country once famed for its
traditions of freedom and liberty into a legal farce where people and
corporations with money can impose silence on others at will.
Libel tourism is making a mockery of British justice, with foreign
plaintiffs able to bring cases against foreign defendants when the
publications in question may have sold just a handful of copies in
England.52
More recently, Mr. Clegg's words have been put into motion, as Lord
Lester of Herne Hill introduced a defamation bill that would modify English
common law in a way that would, in some respects, move it closer to U.S.
law. 5 The Defamation Bill contains twenty-two clauses, three of which are
particularly significant to the discussion in this paper.
Clause 1 of the Defamation Bill clarifies and essentially codifies the rule
of Reynolds.54  The clause would create a defense of "responsible
publication" for statements on matters of "public interest."5 The
Defamation Bill then lays out a series of factors that parallel the factors
American courts use to determine actual malice or negligence in a U.S.
defamation action.
52. Libel Laws Making Mockery of Justice, Say Lib Dems, B.B.C. NEWS (Jan. 18, 2010, 17:29
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/politics/8466297.stm.
53. See Defamation Bill, 2010-11, H.L. Bill [3] (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/1d2OlOl dbills/003/l1003.i-ii.html.
54. See Defamation Bill cl. 1; Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1999] 4 All E.R. 609 (H.L.)
625 (appeal taken from Eng.); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
55. See Defamation Bill cl. 1.
56.
Those circumstances may include (among other things)-
(a) the nature of the publication and its context;
(b) the nature and seriousness of anything alleged about the claimant;
(c) what information the defendant had before publication;
(d) what steps (if any) were taken by the defendant to verify what was published;
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Clause 10 of the Defamation Bill would create a single publication rule,
so that "the first occasion on which the publication is made available to the
public generally (or to any section of the public) is to be regarded for all
purposes as the date of publication of each subsequent publication."s7
Application of such a rule would overturn at least 150 years of precedent in
England and eliminate the situation where each republication of an allegedly
defamatory statement creates a new cause of action.ss
Clause 13 of the Defamation Bill speaks directly to the issue of libel
tourism.5 9  It applies to defamation actions where "the words or matters
complained of have also been published outside the jurisdiction."6 In such
cases the bill provides that: "No harmful event is to be regarded as having
occurred in relation to the claimant unless the publication in the jurisdiction
can reasonably be regarded as having caused substantial harm to the
claimant's reputation having regard to the extent of publication
elsewhere."
Should Lord Lester's bill become law, it would go a long way toward
bringing English defamation law into line with U.S. law. Not everyone,
however, has cheered such a move. During a second reading of Lord
Lester's bill in the House of Lords on July 9, 2010, Lord Hoffman of
Chedworth 62 offered extensive criticism of the proposed legislation, both
defending English law's historical protection of reputation63  and also
criticizing legislation in the United States as "an extraordinary example of
(e) if appropriate, whether the defendant gave the claimant an opportunity to comment
before publication;
(f) whether there were factors supporting urgent publication;
(g) the extent of the defendant's compliance with any relevant code of conduct or other
relevant guidelines ....
Id at cl. 1(4); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) ("The
constitutional guarantees [of freedom of speech and freedom of the press] require, we think, a
federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.").
57. Defamation Bill cl. i0(l)(a).
58. Lord Lester's Defamation Bill-Main Provisions, PRESS GAZETTE, (June 2, 2010),
http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/story.asp?storycode=45524; see also supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
59. See Defamation Bill cl. 13.
60. Id. at cl. 13(1).
61. Id. at cl. 13(2).
62. Lord Hoffman had a long career as a lawyer and judge and ended his career as a Law Lord of
Appeal in the Ordinary. See The Rt Hon Lord Hoffimann, PC, DEBRETr's, http://www.debretts.
com/people/biographies/browse/h/19052/Leonard%20Hoffmann+HOFFMANN.aspx (last visited
Nov. 7,2010).
63. During debate, Lord Hoffman quoted with favor a passage from a Canadian Supreme Court
opinion: "An individual's reputation is not to be treated as regrettable but unavoidable road kill on
the highway of public controversy." 720 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) (2010) 431 (U.K.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/palld200lll/ldhansrd/text/l00709-0001.htm (quoting WIC
Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420 (Can.)).
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American extraterritoriality-something which [the United States is] very
fond of, and something of which I hope the Minister has taken note."" At
the end of his statement, Lord Hoffman expressed hope for a slower reform
process, rather than passing something because of pressure from abroad:
I am anxious that because of the head of steam that has been got up
as a result of the Americans, we should not proceed with precipitate
haste. It is true that the reports of earlier committees have taken a
long time to bear fruit, and sometimes there has been a poor crop;
but the Government are committed to reform and there should be no
undue delay in taking a little time for careful and dispassionate
consideration. There are matters such as libel tourism and the
working of the public interest defence about which we simply do
not have enough information to make a proper judgment."
IV. COMITY CONCERNS AND SOME SUGGESTIONS
Lord Hofftan's comments highlight a concern about the collateral
effect of U.S. legislation aimed at curbing libel tourism. Such legislation
has the ability to impact much more than just defamation actions-it might
well create foreign policy friction among nations that, in the normal course
of business, would respect valid judgments rendered in one another's
courts.66 A number of commentators have raised the same concern about the
spate of U.S. legislation designed to curb libel tourism. Professor Douglas
Rendleman, for example, argues that a broad-brush rejection of all foreign
defamation judgments "is both too blunt and too broad."67  Others have
agreed, asserting that U.S. legislation violates longstanding international
legal principles by attempting to create rules of law for other countries.
The result might undermine "policies of comity that are necessary for strong
international relations at a time when the United States needs them most."69
64. Id at Column 432.
65. Id at Column 433.
66. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. It is fair to note, however, that the failure to curb
libel tourism also creates the potential for foreign policy friction. So, in the end, action by more than
one country would be the ideal way to address the issue. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
67. Rendleman, supra note 2, at 487 (arguing that the idea "that a foreign nation's substantive
law is 'repugnant' unless it is identical to ours is itself a repugnant one").
68. See Moore, supra note 3, at 3236 (citing John J. Walsh, The Myth of 'Libel Tourism', 238
N.Y. L.J. 2, col. 3 (2007)); Rendleman, supra note 2, at 484 ("As a matter of constitutional law, are
we to suppose that the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment applies to conduct and litigation in a
foreign nation?").
69. See Moore, supra note 3, at 3236; Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 2, at 278 (stating that
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Concerns about comity should lead critics of libel tourism to step back
as they consider a response. Certainly, it is legitimate to address a clash of
policy and mores when faced with the possibility of enforcing foreign
judgments. The American Law Institute, for example, lists a series of
circumstances where non-recognition is appropriate,o including a situation
where "the judgment or the claim on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of the United States."7' Does this include a
defamation judgment that might not pass First Amendment muster? A
number of courts have held that this is the case. 2 I would preach caution in
reaching this conclusion, however, and advocate for a consistent approach to
the issue, rather than patchwork legislation. From that perspective, this
paper offers several thoughts.
First, uniformity is important in addressing libel tourism, so federal
legislation is preferable to individual state responses. The new U.S.
SPEECH Act 73 is a step in the right direction. It could be improved,
however, by making clear that the federal constitution alone sets the
standard for determining the enforceability of a foreign judgment, rather
than opening the door to evaluation of foreign judgments on the basis of
state laws that might impose additional requirements on defamation
plaintiffs.74 Given the possibility of foreign relations friction that might
follow a policy of non-enforceability, the federal government-and federal
courts-should play the primary role in determining what violates public
policy when free speech is at issue. One way of accomplishing this would
be to include broad removal sections in the legislation, not only for those
who face a proceeding to enforce a foreign defamation judgment, 7  but also
for those who face a declaratory judgment action seeking non-
enforcement.76 This suggestion is not meant to be disrespectful of state
legislation in U.S. raises "comity concerns and resentment from long-time allies").
70. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 44, § 5.
71. Id. § 5(a)(vi).
72. See supra note 21.
73. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
74. The new U.S. law states that:
[A] domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation
unless the domestic courts determines that-(A) the defamation law applied in the
foreign court's adjudication provided at least as much protection for freedom of speech
and press in that case as would be provided by the first amendment to the Constitution of
the United States and by the constitution and law of the State in which the domestic court
is located ....
SPEECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, § 3, 124 Stat. 2380, 2381 (2010) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § §
4102(a)(1)) (emphasis added).
75. Id. § 3, 124 Stat. at 2383 (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. §4103) (permitting removal based on
diversity in "any action brought in a State domestic court to enforce a foreign judgment for
defamation. . . without regard to the amount in controversy between the parties.").
76. See Rendleman, supra note 2, at 487 ("Congress might consider general federal legislation to
create a uniform national approach by establishing either exclusive federal-court jurisdiction or
concurrent federal-state court jurisdiction over foreign-nation judgments with final review by the
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policy determinations in the area of defamation and speech. Rather it
recognizes the federal government's special role in matters of foreign affairs
and international relations.
Second, it is unduly provocative and potentially unproductive for federal
legislation to provide monetary penalties beyond non-enforcement.n This
assertion is not based merely on comity grounds, but also on grounds that
affirmative reasons exist for the United States (and other countries) to
maximize the number of situations where foreign judgments are recognized
on a reciprocal basis. As Professor Yaad Rotem recently argued, doing so
generally "engender[s] cooperation and reduce[s] the overall costs of
litigation" for all nations involved. The recent changes to U.S. legislation
eliminating the possibility of damages against foreign defamation plaintiffs
(as the FSPA originally provided), combined with the obvious sensitivity of
many in England to the issue of libel tourism, represent steps in the right
direction in this regard.
Third, to the extent possible, U.S. legislation, or at least judicial
interpretation of the legislation, should explicitly focus on the core First
Amendment policy of fostering robust and unfettered public debate, 9 rather
than tying itself to every particular detail of First Amendment doctrine. The
language in the current statute is not clear on this point. The law states that a
foreign judgment shall not be recognized or enforced unless it "provided for
as much protection for freedom of speech and press . .. as would be
provided by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United
States . . . ."so Does this mean that even "'minor' deviations" from case law
interpreting the First Amendment would make a foreign judgment
unenforceable in the United States?"' For example, New York Times v.
U.S. Supreme Court."). Without such provisions, a situation might arise where a foreign judgment is
enforceable in one state because it is found to satisfy First Amendment principles, but not in another
where speech protections are broader.
77. Professor Rendleman agrees. See Rendleman, supra note 2, at 486-87. Writing when the
FSPA was still pending in Congress, he stated: "The FSPA's remedies provisions for injunctions,
damages, trebling, and clawback add insult to disrespect. Congress ought to refuse to pass it." Id at
487.
78. Rotem, supra note 32, at 509. However, Rotem also cautions that nations have been
"reluctant to recognize foreign judgments in order to protect local defendants, to encourage an
incoming transfer of assets and capital, and to allow additional litigation and increased income for
certain influential groups." Id. The article provides a thorough economic analysis supporting the
notion that nations should generally enforce one another's judgments.
79. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
80. SPEECH Act, § 3, 124 Stat. at 2381 (to be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)).
81. See Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague Judgments
Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1283, 1305-06 (1998) (criticizing the implicit holding in
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992) that even "minor"
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Sullivan states that plaintiffs should prove "actual malice" by "clear and
convincing evidence."82 Does this mean that if England changes its
defamation rules as Lord Lester's bill proposes, but permits a plaintiff to
prove a fault standard by a "preponderance of the evidence," all judgments
would be categorically unenforceable? Doing so would be overly
formalistic, rather than truly sensitive to the policy involved.
Fourth-and in connection with the previous point-there should be no
general presumption that it is inherently wrong to sue an American in
another country. As Professor Rendleman wrote: "Filing a defamation
lawsuit in a foreign nation is not tortious misconduct.... Courts and
legislatures should reject the idea that a particular substantive category of
foreign-nation judgments, those for libel, can never be collected in the
United States."8 A case like Ehrenfeld is on the extreme end of the
spectrum-Ehrenfeld did little to inject her work into the foreign markets
and, notwithstanding the internet, she did little to promote her work or ideas
there.84 In this type of situation, concerns that the foreign judgment might
chill her ability to engage in speech in the United States easily could
outweigh concerns about respect for English defamation law.85 But it is not
hard to imagine a situation much closer to the line. What if an author
published a book in the United States but aggressively marketed it overseas?
What if sales and distribution there were much wider than in Ehrenfeld? In
such a case, comity would dictate more respect for the judgment if the
foreign plaintiff sought to enforce it in the United States against the author.
In short, it is reasonable to take into account the extent to which a speaker
has actively disseminated her ideas in other countries in deciding whether
enforcement of a foreign judgment is "repugnant to the public policy of the
United States."
Finally, it is worth noting that defamation reform efforts in England,
such as Lord Lester's bill, should be viewed as an opportunity for a
cooperative approach to the problem of libel tourism, particularly in those
cases where the speaker's contact with the United Kingdom is minimal.
Other mechanisms could be adopted as well-perhaps English courts could
adopt broader use of forum non conveniens where neither the plaintiff nor
defendant have strong contacts with the country or, in the long-term, perhaps
deviations from American free-speech standards violate public policy and render judgments
unenforceable).
82. See N. Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 286.
83. Rendleman, supra note 2, at 487.
84. See Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 832-34 (N.Y. 2007).
85. See id. at 836 ("Plaintiff also asserts that the alleged chill caused by the English judgment has
been felt by certain publishers who have accepted her work in the past, but decline to do so now for
unspecified reasons, and by other authors engaged in the investigation of international terrorism
whom she alleges must now tailor their writing to avoid foreign libel suits.").
86. This assumes that the judgment comports with the other factors laid out in the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 481-82 (1987).
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a number of countries could pursue efforts at resolving differences through
treaty negotiations. In the end, nations on both sides of the libel tourism
debate should look for ways to respect historical approaches to protection of
reputation and free speech, even if those approaches differ among nations.
Given that technology has changed the way that information is disseminated
across the globe-and no doubt will continue to do so-any other approach
is bound to engender conflict that is unsatisfactory to all involved.
V. CONCLUSION
Does the world still need U.S. tort law? The answer is surely yes. But
should U.S. law govern all tortious conduct across the globe? Here the
answer is certainly not. The issue of libel tourism provides a timely and
interesting example of tensions that can arise when U.S. law differs from
that of other nations, especially in a world where "conduct" can quickly and
easily cross borders. Balancing the interests of free speech, individual
reputation, and comity is not an easy thing to do. But it is best done in an
environment where legislators and judges respect the policies of other
nations and act judiciously when taking steps to protect their own mores and
values. This paper has attempted to contribute to the debate in that spirit,
and hopefully in a spirit that reflects the important work and remarkable
career of Justice Allen Linden.
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87. See Staveley-O'Carroll, supra note 2, at 288-89 (noting that a treaty would be the best
approach, but suggesting that it is impractical in the short term as it would "take years to establish"
at best).
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